Evidence Act Sec.90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old = 30 years Old presumption- Reg. Gift Deed presumption - how to recon 30 years whether from the date of filing in court or at the time of tendering in evidence - Apex court held that at the time of tendering evidence - 2015 S.C (1/2015) MSK LAW REPORTS 14

 30 years Old presumption-  Reg. Gift Deed presumption - how to recon 30 years whether from the date of filing in court or at the time of tendering in evidence - Apex court held that at the time of tendering evidence -  90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.-Where any  document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced  from  any  custody which the Court in the particular  case  considers  proper,  the  Court  may presume that the signature and every other  part  of  such  document,  which purports to be in the handwriting of  any  particular  person,  is  in  that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed  or  attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by  whom  it  purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.-Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are  in  the place in which, and under the care of  the  person  with  whom,  they  would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it  is  proved  to  have  had  a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case  are  such as to render such an origin probable." This Explanation applies also to section 81. The law surrounding the date of computation of the  elapse  of  thirty-years stands long-settled, since the verdict of  the  Privy  Council  in  Surendra Krishna Roy v. Mirza Mahammad Syed Ali Mutawali AIR 1936 PC 15,  which  held that the period of thirty years is to be reckoned, not from  the  date  upon which the Deed is filed in Court but from the date on which, it having  been tendered in evidence, its genuineness or otherwise becomes the  province  of proof.  Most  often  where  the   Courts countenance document which has been in existence for thirty years  or  more, the likelihood of either of the attestators thereof being  alive  is  rather remote.   Once it is satisfactorily  proved  that  the  document  is  thirty years or more in age, Section 90 thereupon dispenses  with  the  formalities of producing the executant and or the attestators thereto. The first and fatal stumbling block of the Appellant's case, then,  is that at the time of tendering of the Gift Deed before the Trial  Court,  the thirty-year maturation period provided by Section 90 was not satisfied,  the Gift Deed having been tendered in evidence  after  around  29  and  one-half years, since he had alluded to it in the course of  the  Defendant/Appellant examining himself  unlike  the  stage  of  pleadings  this  incontrovertibly partook the nature of tendering evidence.  While clarifying law as we have striven to do above,  since  the  Gift Deed in question was tendered  in  evidence  five  months  prior  to  having become thirty years old, the Appeal is devoid of merits. - 2015 S.C (1/2015) MSK LAW REPORTS 14 

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