Motor Accident Claims - Deceased aged 22 - young job holder - he would have serve for 35 years - there is every possibility of increase of his income up to 100% - it should be taken into consideration while fixing accident compensation - in one case the Apex court held that "High Court determined the compensation by granting 100% increase in the income of the deceased. Taking into consideration the fact that in the normal course, the deceased would have served for 22 years and during that period his salary would have certainly doubled, upheld the judgment of the High Court...." in this case the apex court viewed that the courts below have erred in taking the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.11,146/- p.m. From the facts, circumstances and evidence on record, it is clear that the deceased was 27 years of age, working with HDFC as the Manager earning Rs.1,81,860/- per annum (i.e. Rs.15,155/- p.m.) and there were definite chances of his further promotion and consequent increase in salary by way of periodical revision of the salary on the basis of cost of living Index prevalent in the area if he would alive and worked in the bank. Therefore, adding 50% under the head of future prospects to the annual income of the deceased according to the principle laid down in the case of Vimal Kanwar & Ors. (supra), the total loss of income comes to Rs.2,72,790/- per annum [Rs. 1,81,860 + (1/2 * Rs.1,81,860)]. Deducting 10% tax (Rs.27,279/-), net annual income comes to Rs.2,45,511/-. Deducting 1/3rd [Rs.81,837] towards personal expenses since the claimants are the parents of the deceased, loss of dependency comes to 1,63,674 X 11(appropriate multiplier as per the age of the parent) Rs. 18,00,414/-. -2015SC msklawreport

Motor Accident Claims - Deceased aged 22 - young job holder - he would have serve for 35 years - there is every possibility of increase of his income up to 100% - it should be taken into consideration while fixing accident compensation - 
in one case the Apex court held that
"High  Court
determined the compensation by granting 100% increase in the income  of  the
deceased. Taking into consideration the fact that in the normal course,  the
deceased would have served for 22 years and during that  period  his  salary
would have certainly doubled, upheld the judgment of the High Court...." 
 in this case the apex court viewed that
the courts below have erred in taking the monthly income of the deceased  at
Rs.11,146/- p.m. From the facts, circumstances and evidence  on  record,  it
is clear that the deceased was 27 years of age, working  with  HDFC  as  the
Manager earning Rs.1,81,860/- per annum (i.e. Rs.15,155/-  p.m.)  and  there
were definite chances of his further promotion and  consequent  increase  in
salary by way of periodical revision of the salary on the basis of  cost  of
living Index prevalent in the area if he  would  alive  and  worked  in  the
bank. Therefore, adding 50% under  the  head  of  future  prospects  to  the
annual income of the deceased according to the principle laid  down  in  the
case of Vimal Kanwar & Ors. (supra), the  total  loss  of  income  comes  to
Rs.2,72,790/- per  annum          [Rs.  1,81,860  +  (1/2  *  Rs.1,81,860)].
Deducting 10% tax (Rs.27,279/-), net annual income comes  to  Rs.2,45,511/-.
Deducting 1/3rd [Rs.81,837] towards personal expenses  since  the  claimants
are the parents of the deceased, loss of dependency  comes  to  1,63,674   X
11(appropriate multiplier as per the age of the parent) Rs. 18,00,414/-. -2015SC msklawreport

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