Order VII Rules10 & 11 read with Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 3(4) of the Haryana Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979 - suitfor for declaration to the effect that the Buy-back Agreement dated 16.7.1996 executed by the plaintiff at Hisar with defendant No. 1 is null and void ab initio and is liable to be set-aside and in the alternative for declaration to the effect that the recovery of defendant No. 1 on the basis of this agreement has become time barred and that the Recovery Certificate issued by the Managing Director of the defendant No. 1 on the basis of this Agreement is null and void ab initio and is liable to be set-aside with the consequential relief of permanent injunction (prohibitory) restraining the defendants from implementing the Recovery Certificate against the plaintiff in any manner including his arrest may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff(s) and against the defendant(s) with costs. - it is clear by mere reading of the plaint that firstly, the plaintiff was a "defaulter" as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act; secondly, the investment made by defendant No.1- Corporation pursuant to an agreement dated 16.07.1996 was in the nature of the "financial assistance" as defined under Section 2 (d) of the Act; thirdly, the demand raised by the respondent was in relation to the amount given by way of financial assistance under Section 3 of the Act and lastly, the subject matter of the suit viz., challenge to the legality of the agreement and the demand fell under Section 3(4)(a) and (b) of the Act. In the light of the four aforementioned facts, which are clearly discernable from the averments made in the plaint, we are of the considered opinion that the provisions of the Act get attracted to the case in hand which, in turn, attract the bar contained in sub-section (4) of Section 3 in filing the civil suit by the defaulter. The suit is, therefore, apparently barred by virtue of bar contained in Section 3(4) of the Act. It was thus rightly dismissed by the courts below by taking recourse to Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code.=2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS



"That the plaintiff is aware of the fact that  the  jurisdiction
           of the  civil  court  is  barred  under  Haryana  Public  Moneys
           (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979.  But he is also aware of  the  law
           laid down by the Hon'ble 5 Judges of the Apex  Court  of   India
           reported  in  AIR  1969  SC  78  that  in  case  the   Statutory
           Authorities  do  not  act  in  accordance  with  the   procedure
           prescribed in the Statues, then the Civil Court  alone  has  the
           jurisdiction to entertain and try every suit.  The present  suit
           is no exception to the law laid  down  by  the  Hon'ble  Supreme
           Court of India."
     On receipt of the notice of the  suit,  the  defendants
     entered appearance and filed an application under Order  VII  Rules
     10 & 11 read with Section 21 of the Code of Civil  Procedure,  1908
     (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). Defendant  No.1  contended
     that the suit  of  this  nature  for  claiming  the  aforementioned
     reliefs was not maintainable by virtue of express bar contained  in
     Section 3(4) of the Act, which in  clear  terms  provided  that  no
     Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon
     any case relating to the recovery of any sum due from the defaulter
     and if any such suit is pending at the commencement of the  Act  in
     any Civil Court then it shall abate.   Defendant  No.1,  therefore,
     contended that since the plaintiff has challenged the agreement  as
     also the recovery notice issued by the Tahsildar under Section 3 of
     the Act in the Civil Suit, the  same  was  not  maintainable  being
     barred by Section 3(4) of the Act.  It was, therefore, liable to be
     dismissed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code read with  Section
     (3)4 of the Act.

The trial Court, by order dated 16.8.2003, allowed  the
     application filed by defendant No.1 and, in consequence,  dismissed
     the suit.
The High Court, by  impugned  judgment,
     dismissed the revision in limine and upheld the order of the  trial
     court. It is against this judgment/order the  plaintiff  has  filed
     this appeal by way of special leave.
The question as to whether a suit is barred by any law or not would
      always depend upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.
      However, for deciding this question, only the averments made in the
      plaint are relevant.  Since the question  of  jurisdiction  of  the
      Civil Court to entertain and try the civil suit goes  to  the  very
      root of the case and hence it can be raised  at  any  time  by  the
      defendant by taking recourse to the provisions of Order VII Rule 11
      of the Code.  Indeed,  this  principle  of  law  is  well  settled.


        So far as the provisions  of  the  Act  are  concerned,
      Section 3 of the Act empowers the Corporation to make  recovery  of
      its outstanding dues from the defaulter as arrears of land  revenue
      by getting the certificate of recovery of the  amount  issued  from
      the competent authority whereas sub-section (4)  of  Section  3  in
      clear terms takes away the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil  Court  to
      entertain or/and adjudicate "any case" relating to the recovery  of
      any sum due from the defaulter. It also takes away the jurisdiction
      of Civil Court to proceed with  any  pending  case  involving  such
      issue.  If any such case is pending on the date of commencement  of
      the Act, such case shall stand abate.

 it is clear by mere reading of the  plaint  that
      firstly, the plaintiff was a  "defaulter" as defined under  Section
      2(c) of the Act; secondly, the investment made by  defendant  No.1-
      Corporation pursuant to an agreement dated 16.07.1996  was  in  the
      nature of the "financial assistance" as defined under Section 2 (d)
      of the Act; thirdly, the demand raised by  the  respondent  was  in
      relation to the amount given by way of financial  assistance  under
      Section 3 of the Act and lastly, the subject  matter  of  the  suit
      viz., challenge to the legality of the  agreement  and  the  demand
      fell under Section 3(4)(a) and (b) of the Act.
           In the light of the four aforementioned  facts,  which
      are clearly discernable from the averments made in the  plaint,  we
      are of the considered opinion that the provisions of  the  Act  get
      attracted to the case in hand  which,  in  turn,  attract  the  bar
      contained in sub-section (4) of Section 3 in filing the civil  suit
      by the defaulter. The suit  is,  therefore,  apparently  barred  by
      virtue of bar contained in Section 3(4) of the Act.   It  was  thus
      rightly dismissed by the courts below by taking recourse  to  Order
      VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code.=2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS

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